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Xi Jinping has prioritized National Rejuvenation, a new pillar in the Chinese social contract 
based on the view that western powers exploited China during a Century of Humiliation and now, 
under the Communist Party, China is reclaiming its former glory. As China approaches its 
centennial in 2049, the CPC has prioritized fully reunifying and integrating Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Macau with the mainland. Through a comparative analysis of Hong Kong and Macau’s 
demographics and political and economic institutions, this thesis examines the current status of the 



















 After Mao Zedong led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to victory in the Chinese Civil 
War, its Nationalist opponents fled to the island of Taiwan where they have governed themselves 
independently from the mainland since the People’s Republic of China’s establishment in 1949. 
Macau and Hong Kong, small cities in southeast China, also remained independent from the 
mainland, ruled by Portugal and the United Kingdom, respectively. China has long sought to 
reunite these territories under the rule of the CPC.  
In 1997 the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty under a policy 
called One Country, Two Systems. China would control Hong Kong’s foreign affairs and defense, 
but Hong Kong would retain its western economic and political systems, maintaining significant 
autonomy from the mainland for at least 50 years. Portugal returned Macau to the mainland in 
1999 under a similar arrangement. Now more than two decades since the handovers, Hong Kong 
and Macau have charted substantially different paths; while Hongkongers complain that the 
mainland has violated the city’s semi-autonomy, Macau has embraced further integration with 
China.  
Now under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the CPC has attempted to promote a nationalistic 
sentiment through National Rejuvenation, a policy based on the view that China, exploited by the 
west during a Century of Humiliation, is now returning to its rightful place in history under the 
CPC. A major component of National Rejuvenation is reunifying with Taiwan and fully integrating 
Hong Kong and Macau into the mainland. Through a comparative analysis of Hong Kong and 
Macau’s demographics and political and economic institutions, this thesis examines the current 





In August 2019, Hong Kong marked its twelfth straight weekend of anti-government 
protests. Protestors chanted their five demands – including the immediate resignation of chief 
executive Carrie Lam – amidst an onslaught of tear gas and newly deployed water cannons. Yet 
just 40 miles away in neighboring Macau, citizens witnessed an ordinary Sunday as Ho Iat-Seng 
was unceremoniously elected Macau’s chief executive, receiving 98 percent support from the 
city’s pro-Beijing electoral committee.1 
 Macau and Hong Kong are similar in many ways. Both cities, former European colonies 
that reverted to Chinese sovereignty at the end of the twentieth century, share close geographic 
proximity and are governed under China’s One Country, Two Systems policy. Yet the direction 
of the two cities has sharply diverged: while Hongkongers increasingly reject further integration 
with mainland China, the Communist Party of China (CPC) lauds Macau for recognizing that “one 
country” is “the prerequisite and basis” for “two systems” – in other words, accepting the Chinese 
government’s hand in the city’s governance.2  
 Through the lens of Hong Kong and Macau, this thesis will explore China’s One Country, 
Two Systems policy and its significance as a core component in Xi Jinping’s National 
Rejuvenation policy. Based on an analysis of Hong Kong and Macau’s demographics and political 
and economic institutions, this thesis will also project how the cities’ relationships with mainland 
China will evolve in the coming years.  
 
1 Carvalho, R. (2019, August 25). “Ho Iat-seng will be new city leader of Macau, China’s gambling hub.” Retrieved 
from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3024253/ho-iat-seng-will-be-
new-leader-macau-chinas-gambling-hub 
2 Xinhua. (2019, December 21). “Xi laud's Macao's ‘shining chapter’ of "one country, two systems" practice.” 





One Country, Two Systems: A Means to an End 
 Chinese reunification has been a perennial goal for the CPC, and One Country, Two 
Systems is merely a means towards achieving that goal. The policy was formulated for Taiwanese 
reunification when it became clear that after decades of military confrontation Taiwan was no 
closer to reunification with the mainland than it was in 1949. Through this policy, China 
abandoned its “stick” approach and instead offered Taiwan a “carrot.” 
Though the CPC began using the term “One Country, Two Systems” in 1984, the policy’s 
origins date to 1978, when the CPC softened its approach towards reunifying with Taiwan, 
adopting a policy of “peaceful reunification.”3  Over the next several years, China gradually 
formulated this policy, culminating the day before National Day in 1981 when then National 
People’s Congress Chairman Ye Jianying promised “nine guarantees” to Taiwan including 
granting Taiwan significant autonomy as a special administrative region and allowing Taiwan to 
maintain its military.4  
In 1982, as China and the United Kingdom began negotiations over Hong Kong’s future, 
China realized its newfound Taiwan policy could be adapted to Hong Kong. The Chinese 
government passed Article 31 of the Chinese State Constitution authorizing the establishment “of 
special administrative regions” with the systems in each SAR to be determined based on the 
“specific conditions” in each region, paving the way for Hong Kong and eventually Macau’s 
reunification under One Country, Two Systems. 
Implementing One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong allowed China to achieve two 
key objectives. First, allowing Hong Kong to maintain its western-style political institutions 
 





increased the likelihood of the city’s continued prosperity. This not only benefited Hong Kong, 
but also mainland China; the city’s proximity to the mainland, mature financial system, and 
western legal system made the city an ideal safe harbor from which investors could take advantage 
of China’s economic boom. Second, the successful implementation of One Country, Two Systems 
in Hong Kong and later in Macau – particularly by respecting the cities’ autonomy – could 
demonstrate to Taiwan that reuniting with the mainland under a similar arrangement could work.  
One Country, Two Systems and Xi Jinping 
 
 Decades later, One Country, Two Systems is facing a serious challenge in Hong Kong, 
where millions of protestors believe the mainland has infringed upon Hong Kong’s autonomy, 
particularly through its attempt to pass a bill that would authorize the extradition of Hong Kong 
residents to mainland China.  
Despite setbacks in Hong Kong, reunification — including reassuming sovereignty over 
Taiwan and the full integration of Hong Kong and Macau — is more important than ever for the 
CPC as it seeks to expand its mandate as China’s ruling party. Historically, the Chinese social 
contract has been a tradeoff of civil and political rights in exchange for stability and prosperity. 
Shiping Hua notes that “the Chinese legal system was not built on…ideals, but on the pragmatic 
consideration of the elites…to protect its people from the other states.”5 Coming out of the Warring 
States period, the Chinese were willing to accept a strong, authoritarian Qin government as a matter 
of life or death. In its absence, chaos would ensue, preventing China from growing the food its 
people needed to survive. 
 This arrangement persists in modern China, with the Communist Party basing its 
legitimacy on the same two pillars as the Qin empire: stability and prosperity. This is evident in 
 




what Chinese leaders talk about and how they are evaluated for promotion. In this author’s 
experience, when asked why China is not a democracy, most CPC elites will cite social stability. 
They will comment, for example, that “China is not ready for democracy” and note that much of 
China’s population is still relatively uneducated, not to mention the political instability found in 
many developing democracies. Regarding provincial leaders’ performance evaluations, perhaps 
the most important factor is their ability to maintain order – especially through strong public safety 
measures. GDP growth is a very close second.  
However, China’s slowing economy jeopardizes one of the two pillars of the Chinese 
government’s legitimacy. The CPC has worked to manage expectations, guiding for slower future 
economic growth while still touting the government’s previous economic success. But most 
significantly, Xi Jinping has abandoned the post-Mao Chinese government’s purely pragmatic 
approach and has added a third pillar to the Chinese social contract: National Rejuvenation.  
 National Rejuvenation relies on the belief that China suffered at the hands of the West 
during a so-called “Century of Humiliation,” stretching from the start of the First Opium War until 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. During a 2019 visit to Macau, Xi explained 
that “only by knowing the nation’s history of humiliation after the Opium War, can one understand 
the Chinese people’s strong yearning for national rejuvenation.”6  By creating a nationalistic 
sentiment, and accentuating a history of western abuse, the CPC hopes that the Chinese people 
will find a new element of legitimacy in a more assertive and aggressive government even if the 
CPC fails to deliver economically.  
 
6 Xinhua. (2019, December 21). “Xi laud's Macao's ‘shining chapter’ of ‘one country, two systems’ practice.” 
Retrieved from Xinhua: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/21/c_138647103.htm 
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 Xi has made reunification with Taiwan — along with further integration of Hong Kong 
and Macau — “key tenets of his ‘Chinese dream’ of national rejuvenation.”7 By taking back what 
China perceives as rightfully belonging to mainland, the CPC can claim credit for restoring China 
to the glory it historically enjoyed. For Xi, reunification is a core part of his legacy and an urgent 
priority, something he says “shouldn’t just be handed down unfinished from generation to 
generation.”  
Reunification is also personal; Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, served as Communist Party Chief 
in Guangdong (the province bordering Hong Kong and Macau) from 1978-80, the same time the 
CPC was formulating the One Country, Two Systems policy. “Xi Zhongxun,” considered a 
relatively moderate member of the CPC, “became the face of the People’s Republic to Hong Kong 
after the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution...We know that Xi Jinping cares a lot about his 
father’s legacy,” writes Joseph Torigian.  
Between 1985-2002, Xi spent the formative years of his career serving in a variety of roles 
in Fujian – the mainland province closest to Taiwan. Xi would have been intimately familiar with 
cross-strait relations, which were rapidly improving during his time in Fujian. In 1987, the 
Taiwanese government allowed its citizens to visit the mainland for the first time since 1949, and 
in 1991 Taiwan ended its state of war with the mainland leading to direct, high-level talks between 
the two sides.8 In the backdrop of this improving relationship, Xi likely believed that Taiwanese 
reunification was in the party’s grasp only to be ripped away amidst increasing tensions in the late 
1990s.  
 
7 Chun, H. W., & Page, J. (2019, September 27). “For China's Xi, the Hong Kong Crisis Is Personal.” Retrieved 
from Wall Street Journal: https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-chinas-xi-the-hong-kong-crisis-is-personal-
11569613304 





Xi’s career also heavily involved Hong Kong and Macau. During the five years 
immediately preceding his elevation to president, Xi led the Central Coordination Group for Hong 
Kong and Macau Affairs, making him intimately aware of China’s challenges and opportunities 
in those regions. 
Now, as president, Xi views Chinese unification is an unfinished task from his career, a 
key reason why Xi plans to remain in office beyond the customary two terms that previous Chinese 
leaders have served. Unlike his post-Mao predecessors who largely governed as technocrats, Xi 
sees his role differently. Xi frequently references China’s thousands of years of civilization, 
indicating that he sees himself playing a prominent role in his dramatized view of history. Just as 
the Qin dynasty is remembered for unifying China after the Warring States period, Xi hopes his 
dynasty will be remembered for reuniting China with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 
Colonial History 
While Hongkongers engaged in large-scale protests throughout the latter half of 2019, 
Beijing repeatably praised Macau, earning it the nickname “Beijing’s golden child.”9 The origin 
of the two cities’ divergent paths dates to their colonial experiences and the institutions (or lack 
thereof) established by their respective colonizers. 
Portuguese Administration of Macau 
 Unlike Britain, which seized Hong Kong as a spoil of the First Opium War, Portugal’s 
arrival in Macau was peaceful. Portuguese merchants who had developed trading relationships 
with their Chinese counterparts originally settled the territory during the Ming Dynasty. After the 
Portuguese helped capture the notorious pirate Zhang Silao, the Sino-Portuguese relationship 
 
9 Siu, P. (2019, December 17). “20 years after handover: can Beijing’s golden child Macau grow up to be more than 




significantly improved.10  In 1573 the Portuguese formalized their presence through a signed 
agreement with local authorities; in exchange for an annual rent of 500 silver taels, the Chinese 
allowed Portuguese merchants — not soldiers — to reside in the city, but not to exercise 
sovereignty over the territory.  
Throughout several centuries, the Portuguese incrementally expanded their presence in 
Macau but avoided open confrontation with Chinese authorities. They installed a Catholic bishop 
in 1586 and in 1605 built up defensive capabilities, including a city wall, to thwart Dutch attacks. 
But the Chinese maintained significant power within the city. During the tensions leading up to 
the Opium Wars – a series of trade-related skirmishes between China and European powers – the 
Qing Dynasty even established a customs station in Macau to seize contraband before it made its 
way up the Pearl River to Canton. Finally, in 1887, the Chinese and Portuguese entered the Sino-
Portuguese Treaty of Friendship, clarifying Macau’s status under “perpetual occupation” but, in 
the eyes of the Chinese, ensuring the China retained sovereignty over the territory.11  
 In the decades following the Opium Wars, Macau’s status as a major port diminished, and 
the colony was eclipsed by the newly formed British colony in Hong Kong. Macau’s economy 
stagnated, and the Portuguese lost interest in administering the colony, allowing gambling, 
prostitution, and other vices to prop up the city’s fledgling economy. During World War II, Japan 
never formally occupied Macau, respecting the Portuguese government’s neutrality. In 1966, 
Macau experienced Cultural Revolution-inspired riots and the Portuguese effectively lost control 
of the city. “The Portuguese governor was handed a list of demands from the Chinese community, 
 
10 da Silva Rêgo, A. (n.d.). “DIRECT SAILINGS BETWEEN MACAO AND BRAZIL: AN UNREALIZABLE 
DREAM?” (1717-1810). Retrieved from Macau Cultural Affairs Bureau: 
http://www.icm.gov.mo/rc/viewer/20022/1059 
11 Lin, J. (1997, July 3). “The other land reverting to China Macau: This Portuguese-run enclave an hour north of  
Hong Kong by ferry is not as fast-paced as its modern neighbor, but it, too, is being turned over to China.” 




including the promise to crack down on activities by the Nationalist Chinese in the enclave,” writes 
Jennifer Lin. “Humiliating the colonial rulers further, Red Guards who had infiltrated Macau took 
to the streets to direct traffic.”12  
Unlike the British government in Hong Kong, which responded to its own Cultural 
Revolution-inspired protests by embarking on major governmental reforms, the Portuguese in 
1974 attempted to return the territory to China; Mao refused.13 Historians cite three reasons for 
this refusal. First, China, emerging from the Cultural Revolution, had its hands full with domestic 
concerns. Second, China remained still largely closed off from the outside world and relied on 
Hong Kong and Macau as a medium through which to communicate with the west and obtain hard 
currency. Finally, at that time the CPC prioritized reunifying with Taiwan before Hong Kong and 
Macau. However, one thing was clear: China had near de facto control in Macau and it was only 
a matter of time before it became de jur.  
 Seemingly giving up on the colony after the riots, Macau’s Portuguese administrators 
reduced investments in education, public security, and infrastructure. Back home, Portugal faced 
its own political turmoil, culminating in the anti-colonial Carnation Revolution in 1974. In 
Portugal’s 1976 constitution, the now democratic country declared that Macau was only under 
temporary Portuguese administration. Three years later, China and Portugal signed the Acta 
Secreta, a secret memo in which the two sides agreed that though Portugal administered Macau, it 
 
12 Lin, J. (1997, July 3). “The other land reverting to China Macau: This Portuguese-run enclave an hour north of  
Hong Kong by ferry is not as fast-paced as its modern neighbor, but it, too, is being turned over to China.” 
Retrieved from Baltimore Sun: https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1997-07-03-1997184009-
story.html 





lacked sovereignty over the territory. The memo also allowed China to call for negotiations at any 
time over Macau’s status.14 
 Knowing its time in Macau was ending, Portugal attempted to revitalize the colony prior 
to its impending 1999 handover to China. Portugal had a tainted colonial record and hoped to 
somewhat rehabilitate its image, exiting Macau with some dignity intact. Yet by the 1990s Macau 
had become a disorderly place overrun by criminal organizations called triads. Violent crime was 
rampant, with one observer describing “gang-land style shootings” outside of Macau’s most 
prominent casinos. 
 Leading up to the handover, it also became apparent that, as a result of Portugal’s 
minuscule investment in the Macanese education system, the local population lacked the training 
and experience necessary to run the city’s government. In cooperation with the Portuguese 
government, China allegedly sent 12 promising mainland legal graduates – none of whom had any 
ties to Macau – to Portugal to study the Portuguese language and legal system.15 The Chinese 
government then embedded them in the Macanese government in the mid 1990s prior to the 
handover. Today they are among Macau’s highest-ranking officials. 
 Despite Portugal having a presence in Macau for more than four centuries, in just 20 years 
since the handover Portugal is now an afterthought in modern Macau. Even at the time of the 
handover, Macau lacked a strong Portuguese identity. Macau’s 2001 census revealed that only 
three percent of the population could speak Portuguese.16 In contrast, Britain ruled Hong Kong for 
 
14 Mendes, C. A. (2013). “Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986-1999.” Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press. 
15 Siu, P. (2019, December 17). “Beijing sent team of mainlanders to study law in Portugal, placed them in top 
Macau jobs after return to China.” Retrieved from South China Morning Post: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3042420/beijing-sent-team-mainlanders-study-law-
portugal-placed 




just over a third of the time Portugal ruled Macau, yet a survey also conducted in 2001 indicated 
that 38.8 percent of Hongkongers could speak English, a number that had risen to more than 50 
percent by 2016.17 
British Administration of Hong Kong 
Britain’s history in Hong Kong dates to 1841 when Captain Charles Elliot secured the 
island’s cessation from China. Upon hearing the news, British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston 
castigated Elliot for taking a “barren island” that he believed would never become “a mart of 
trade.”18 Elliot initially seized the island as a tactical move to provide a base near the mouth of the 
Pearl River. But shortly thereafter, he authorized the auction of real estate and began building 
infrastructure without the consent of the British government. One year later, the Treaty of Nanking 
made the cessation of Hong Kong permanent. Despite Elliot being recalled back to London for 
ignoring Lord Palmerston’s orders, Elliot’s decisive actions made “the establishment of Hong 
Kong as a British colony…fait accompli before the Cabinet had resolved the matter one way or 
the other,” and in 1843, the British government reluctantly made Hong Kong an official crown 
colony. 19  
The nascent colony’s territory expanded over the next half century, first in 1860, when 
China permanently ceded the tip of Kowloon, then in 1898, when Britain secured a 99-year lease 
of the “New Territories,” which comprised 235 small islands around Hong Kong and 287 square 
miles of territory north of Kowloon. 
 
17 Lo, K. (2019, August 21). “The trouble with trying to turn Hong Kong's young people into 'patriotic youth'.” 
Retrieved from South China Morning Post:https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/ 
3023606/trouble-trying-turn-hong-kongs-young-people-patriotic-youth 




Initially, Hong Kong was an unruly place, described by one resident as a “resort of outlaws, 
opium-smugglers, and, indeed, all persons who had made themselves obnoxious to the Chinese 
laws.” Triads operated openly in the city, and the situations became so bad that in 1845, governor 
Sir John Bowring authorized vigilante troops to “fire upon with intent or effect to kill” the outlaws, 
promising that “no Act done or attempted in pursuance of this Ordinance shall be questioned in 
any court.”20 The British also enacted discriminatory measures against the Chinese living in the 
colony, seeking retribution for the Europeans’ poor treatment at the hands of the Chinese 
government in Canton.  
In 1967, thousands took to the streets in support of the Cultural Revolution, encouraged by 
Red Guards from the mainland. It became clear that Hong Kong’s institutions needed reform, and 
then-governor Sir Murray MacLehose launched a drive to root out corruption. Scores of police 
officers were arrested for their involvement in organized crime and the newly reformed police 
department became known as “Asia’s finest.” Now relatively corruption free, Hong Kong has 
become one of “the most attractive financial-services centre in the region.”21 
 The government adopted a laissez-faire economic approach, which, combined with Hong 
Kong’s improved political institutions, lead to soaring economic growth. The city embarked on 
ambitious infrastructure projects, building a world-class subway system and developing the New 
Territories. The government also invested heavily in education, and by 1997 Hong Kong, including 
its world-class port, rivaled any major city in the world.  
The Handovers 
 Though Hong Kong Island and Kowloon were permanently ceded to the United Kingdom, 
the New Territories were part of a 99-year lease set to expire on July 1, 1997. By the early 1980s, 
 




the New Territories had become deeply integrated into the colony to the point that it would be 
impractical to separate them from the rest of Hong Kong. Further, CPC leader Deng Xiaoping 
made clear that China intended to reassert its sovereignty over all of Hong Kong in 1997, 
reportedly telling British prime minister Edward Heath, as Jonathan Dimbleby describes it, that 
“there would be no role for Britain after 1997.”22  
 Reflecting later about her options, former prime minister Margaret Thatcher noted that she 
had “very few cards” in her hand. The CPC viewed the Treaty of Nanking as invalid because it 
was unequal and forcefully inflicted upon China. Though a weak legal argument, China made clear 
that it would not respect Britain’s sovereignty in Hong Kong after 1997, even over the permanently 
ceded portions of the colony. “There was no way in which we could defend it [Hong Kong Island 
and Kowloon],” Thatcher reflected. “More than that…the Chinese could have just turned off the 
supply of water and food which came from the mainland.”23  
By 1982 Britain decided that it must begin negotiating with China to ensure Hong Kong’s 
continued prosperity. Land mortgages in the city typically lasted 15 years, and the uncertainty over 
Hong Kong’s status after 1997 could severely depress business investment in the city. The HSBC 
building, completed in 1985, offers one prominent example. The building was constructed 
primarily of prefabricated blocks, allegedly so it could be quickly dismantled and relocated if 
things went poorly after the handover. 
 




 For Portugal, Macau’s handover was a foregone conclusion and only a question of timing. 
Viewing negotiations over the status of Macau as much less complicated than Hong Kong, the 
Chinese government opted to complete negotiations with the United Kingdom first.24   
 Early in the negotiations over Hong Kong, China promised to allow Hong Kong to maintain 
its existing way of life and approximate government structure under the newly formulated One 
Country, Two Systems policy. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration, China pledged to grant Hong 
Kong a “high degree of autonomy” for at least 50 years following the handover. Similarly, in the 
Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau, Macau was also promised 50 years of semi-autonomy.  
Priorities During the Negotiations 
 Despite enjoying strong protections of their individual freedoms, Hongkongers lacked the 
right to elect most of their political leaders during the British administration of the city. As the 
handover approached, Britain feared that the mainland would be less benevolent than Britain had 
been in selecting Hong Kong’s leaders. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Britain 
viewed democratic elections as the only way to ensure Hongkongers’ rights would be preserved. 
To that end, Britain fought to include universal suffrage in Hong Kong’s basic law, a series of laws 
which would serve as a quasi-constitution for the city after the handover. But Britain’s position 
was weak, given that it had avoided instituting democratic reforms during the century and a half it 
ruled Hong Kong. Ultimately, China agreed to include universal suffrage as an “aspiration” for 
Hong Kong but refused to make any specific commitments. 
 Regarding Macau, the Portuguese had a much weaker negotiating position than the British 
did over Hong Kong. However, Portugal had leverage in its ability (and perhaps willingness) to 
 





unilaterally withdraw from Macau – leaving the city in a state of chaos. This allowed Portugal to 
extract two important concessions. The first was timing. China hoped to receive Macau at the same 
time as Hong Kong, but Portugal preferred to keep the city until 2007, the 450th Anniversary of 
the country’s presence in Macau. Though China refused this proposal, it did allow Portugal to 
maintain control of Macau until December 1999, the tail end of the twentieth century. 
The second concession was recognition of Macanese residents’ Portuguese citizenship. 
Unlike Britain, which refused to provide full British passports to most Hongkongers, Portugal had 
provided Macanese residents with full Portuguese passports, including work authorization in most 
of Europe. The Chinese government does not generally recognize dual citizenship but made an 
unexpected exception for Macau. Though these concessions were not particularly significant, they 
allowed Portugal to save face and make a dignified exit from one of its last remaining colonies.  
Attitudes Toward the Handovers 
 In Macau, residents expressed general optimism regarding reunification with China. 
“Maybe we’re less anxious about the handover because we don’t have as much to lose,” remarked 
prominent Macanese businessman and future chief executive Edmund Ho. Ho continued, “This is 
so different from Hong Kong, where the attitude is ‘We’re doing well so leave us alone.’ But we 
need the central government’s intervention because Macau cannot do it alone.” 25  This was 
painfully obvious in the pre-handover Macanese government’s response to ongoing triad violence, 
contending that ordinary people need not fear getting caught in triad violence because the murders 
were carried out “by professional killers who never miss their targets.”26 
 
25 Lin, J. (1997, July 3). “The other land reverting to China Macau: This Portuguese-run enclave an hour north of 
Hong Kong by ferry is not as fast-paced as its modern neighbor, but it, too, is being turned over to China.” 
Retrieved from Baltimore Sun: https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1997-07-03-1997184009-
story.html 




According to some accounts, the Chinese government had already assisted in pacifying 
Macau prior to the 1999 handover. In 1997, Chinese officials allegedly brokered a truce between 
two warring triads. Legislator Ng Kuok-Cheng was unsurprised by the rumors. “The Portuguese 
government can’t control anything in Chinese society, so how do you expect them to control the 
14K and Soi Fong [triads]?” Ng questioned.27 
Post-Handover Political Institutions in Hong Kong and Macau 
 Hong Kong and Macau both have similar governmental structures, but Hong Kong’s 
institutions appear to be stronger even amidst the 2019 protests. One area in which the Hong Kong 
government is comparatively stronger is separation of powers. During a 2008 visit to Hong Kong, 
Xi Jinping called for “mutual understanding and support among the executive authorities, the 
legislature and the judiciary” and has echoed that sentiment since.28  Yet in Hong Kong the 
branches seem to operate independently. For example, the Hong Kong High Court struck down an 
emergency ban on wearing masks while protesting, which Hong Kong lawyer Kevin Yam says 
“speaks volumes for Hong Kong’s judicial independence and the rule of law.”29 The Hong Kong 
government’s decentralized powers reflect Britain’s tradition of balancing power between the 
Crown and Parliament.  
 Conversely, Macau’s legislative and judicial branches appear to fall in line under the 
executive. In a letter to the editor of the South China Morning Post reflecting on the twentieth 
anniversary of Macau’s handover to the mainland, Macau resident Barnaby Ieong argues that “the 
 
27 Vines, S. (1997, May 25). “China ends Triad war in Macau.” Retrieved from The Independent:  
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/china-ends-triad-war-in-macau-1263450.html 
28 Xie, E., & Cheung, G. (2019, December 20). “After Xi Jinping’s Macau trip, analysts predict patriotic education 
and national security in Hong Kong’s future.” Retrieved from South China Morning Post: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3043017/after-president-xis-macau-trip-analysts-
predict-patriotic 





executive and legislative branches of the government work in concert with each other…which is, 
no doubt, inconsistent with the checks and balances on which justice is greatly reliant.”30  
 Macau’s legislature of 33 members has only four pro-democracy legislators. Noting the 
legislature’s tendency to rubber-stamp the chief executive’s priorities, pro-democracy lawmaker 
Au Kam San jokingly said that “Even if the government submits a bill to the legislature that only 
has a cover and all the pages are blank, it will still be passed.”31 
Another problem with Macau’s political institutions is that most Macanese literally do not 
know what the law says. Much of Macau’s legal code is written in Portuguese, which less than one 
percent of the population understands. Macau’s high court no longer has any Portuguese jurists, 
and the court often ignores large swaths of relevant untranslated Portuguese-language laws. In 
many regards, Macau’s Portuguese legal system is being squeezed out in favor of one closer to the 
mainland’s at the expense of the rule of law.32 
 In Hong Kong and Macau, the chief executive is selected through an electoral college, 
which, in both cities, is decidedly pro-Beijing. In Hong Kong, electors are chosen from functional 
constituencies that represent various stakeholders. Each of the four constituencies, roughly 
representing commercial, professional, cultural, and governmental interests, has 300 votes. The 
commercial and professional sectors strongly align toward Beijing, largely out of economic 
interests. These constituencies benefit from access to the mainland market that they earn in part 
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because of their loyalty to Beijing’s preferred candidates. They also are skeptical of democracy, 
which they say would push Hong Kong toward a western-style welfare state with “draconian levels 
of taxation needed to finance state pensions, unemployment benefits and a national-health 
service.”33 The governmental constituency also skews towards Beijing, representing, among other 
groups, Hong Kong’s delegates to the National Peoples’ Congress, China’s rubber-stamp 
legislature.  
 In 2014 the CPC announced that Hongkongers would enjoy universal suffrage in the 2017 
chief executive election. The catch is that the two or three candidates permitted to run must be 
selected by a nominating committee of the same composition as the current electoral college.34 
The nominating committee would effectively have a similar function to the Guardian Council in 
Iran. However, hundreds of thousands of Hongkongers took to the streets in the Umbrella Protests 
demanding universal eligibility to stand for election, and the proposal ended up failing in the 
Legislative Council.  
 Macau’s electoral college is similar to Hong Kong’s, comprising of 400 members selected 
from various functional constituencies. Macau’s newly elected chief executive, Ho Iat-Seng, has 
strong ties to the mainland. The first line of his official bio notes that his “ancestral home” is in 
Zhejiang province; he also studied in mainland China, was a member of the National People’s 
Congress, and delivered his inaugural address in Mandarin despite Cantonese being the Chinese 
dialect traditionally spoken in Macau.  
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 The Hong Kong government also more effectively protects individual rights than its 
counterpart in Macau. While the Hong Kong government allowed large scale anti-government 
protests throughout 2019, the Macanese government denied a request to hold a Hong Kong 
sympathy rally and deployed police to arrest any protestors who showed up.35 Macau lawyer Jorge 
Mensezes says that in Macau “people are afraid to voice their opinions” and “freedom of 
expression is now confined to coffee shops and private spaces.”36 
 Though most limitations to free speech in Macau are the result of self-censorship, residents 
suffer consequences for speaking out. For example, three professors were fired from Saint Joseph 
University in Macau ostensibly for political reasons. One of the professors, Eric Sautede, cites two 
reasons he believes he was fired: he hosted a conference on the Chinese Revolution, and he 
commented that he believes chief executive Ho Iat-Seng lacks charisma. Rector Peter Stilwell, 
head of the university, said Sautede crossed the “thin line” from “academic commentary” to 
“political commentary” and his firing served to “clarify matters.” Stilwell said that he hoped that 
Saint Joseph’s would not be perceived as “a haven for foreign interests or for local political 
infighting.”37 In 2008, Wikileaks released a cable written by the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong. 
The cable cited former Saint Joseph rector Ivo Carnerio as saying officials from the Chinese 
Liaison Office in Macau told the university prior to the handoff that two subjects were off limits 
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for criticism: “the ‘one country, two systems’ principle; and the Politburo of the Communist Party 
of China.”38 
 Macau also imposes restrictions on the press. For example, in December 2019 during Ho 
Iat-Seng’s inauguration, the government denied entry into Macau several pre-accredited 
journalists. 39  According to Jorge Mensezes, free press in Macau is confined to English and 
Portuguese language outlets; the “Chinese press is nearly all pro-Beijing.”40  
 Last year, Beijing pushed Hong Kong to implement an extradition bill that would authorize 
the Hong Kong government to send citizens suspected of a crime in the mainland to stand trial 
there. Though chief executive Carrie Lam promised that Hong Kong residents would not be 
extradited for political crimes, Hongkongers were deeply suspicious of the Chinese judicial system 
and launched wide-scale protests in response. 
 Another area Hong Kong has resisted mainland influence is in “national security” 
legislation, which would prohibit actions against the Central Government in Beijing. In 2003 the 
Hong Kong government attempted to add an article in the city’s basic law that would carry 
“maximum life prison sentences for treason, sedition, theft of state secrets and subversion.”41 The 
bill ultimately failed.  
 But in Macau, a similar national-security amendment easily passed in 2008 as Article 23 
of the city’s basic law. The article is as follows: 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 Siu, P. (2019, December 20). “New Macau leader Ho Iat-seng completes transition from 'incapable' candidate to 
chief executive of casino hub.” Retrieved from South China Morning Post: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3043043/new-macau-leader-ho-iat-seng-
completes-transition-incapable 
40 Keegan, M. (2019, December 21). “How China changed Macau, 'the gambling city of the world'.” Retrieved from 
The Independent: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-macau-cotai-strip-gambling-
democracy-tourism-a9253501.html 




Article 23: The Macao Special Administrative Region shall enact laws, on its own, to 
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the Central 
People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations 
or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political 
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political 
organizations or bodies. 
The article calls on Macau to “enact laws” to enforce the article, the first of which the city 
enacted in 2009 as the Law on the Defense of National Security. The act criminalizes sedition, 
violence, or “other grave illegal acts” against the central government, carrying penalties of up to 
30 years in prison.42 In January 2019, Macau’s legislative council passed a bill expanding the size 
and powers of the Judiciary Police, granting the agency “exclusive competence” over national 
security and cyber crimes.43 The law also waives the government’s requirement to disclose the 
identity of certain police officers, which one law maker described as creating a “secret police” 
force.44 Security Secretary Wong Sio Chak categorically rejected this comparison. 
 Another area in which Macau has fallen in line with the mainland is “patriotic education,” 
the mainland’s educational curriculum that teaches its preferred historical narrative of a China 
bullied and humiliated by the west that is now reclaiming its former glory with the CPC at the 
helm. During Xi’s visit to Macau in December 2019, he stopped at a local school where he praised 
Macau’s implementation of patriotic education, sitting in on a history class covering “one country, 
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two systems in Macau.”45 But in Hong Kong, the government scrapped plans to introduce the 
curriculum in 2012 amid public outrage.  
Another area in which Macau’s government is lacking is public transportation. While Hong 
Kong has for years enjoyed one of the world’s best public-transportation systems, efficiently 
getting around Macau is a painful exercise for residents. The city finally opened the first phase of 
its long-delayed light-rail system in December 2019, eight years after the initial targeted 
completion date and three times over budget. Ironically, Macau ended up hiring Hong Kong’s 
MTR Corporation to operate the light rail-system.46 
Economic Institutions 
 Hong Kong has been described as a “merchant city,” a pass through that facilitates global 
trade.47 For many multinational companies, the city offers a base from which to invest in mainland 
China. Unlike the mainland, whose state-run banking system prioritizes political interests above 
economic interests, Hong Kong has a well-developed financial system that can safely manage 
foreign money. Investors have chosen to establish offices in Hong Kong because they enjoy the 
city’s independent legal system, in contrast to the mainland’s judiciary, which remains subservient 
to the Communist Party.  
 China recognizes the valuable role Hong Kong plays in facilitating foreign investment in 
the mainland, allowing the country to reap the benefits of liberal institutions without the political 
consequences of implementing them on the mainland. In this sense, Hong Kong’s economy 
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depends extensively on China but not in a way that the mainland could easily manipulate for 
political leverage without harming itself in the process.  
 Macau’s economy, significantly less diversified than Hong Kong’s, depends on tourism, 
which contributed 72.2 percent of the city’s GDP in 2018.48 Nonetheless, Macau, the second 
wealthiest region in the world, boasted a nominal GDP per capital of $81,728 ($115,913 when 
adjusted for purchasing power parity). Macau’s economy has soared since the handover. In 2001, 
the city liberalized its gaming industry, granting new concessions to foreign casino operators. 
Companies such as Las Vegas Sands, Wynn, and MGM entered the market. Starting in 2015, 
casino operators built the Cotai Strip — rivaling its counterpart in Las Vegas — on reclaimed land 
between Macau’s two largest islands. Macau’s gambling revenues now exceed Las Vegas by six-
fold.49  However, Macau casinos are far less successful than their Las Vegas counterparts in 
capturing non-gambling revenue. For example, the Venetian Macao earns more than 80 percent of 
its revenue from gambling operations. In contrast, the Venetian Las Vegas earns less than a quarter 
of its revenue from the casino floor, leveraging revenue streams such as restaurants, conventions, 
shows, and hotel rooms. 
 Along with Macau’s newfound prosperity comes increasing dependence on the mainland. 
Macau’s economic rise is closely tied to China’s, with tourists from the mainland accounting for 
roughly 71 percent of Macau’s visitors.50 Mainland residents must gain authorization from the 
Chinese government to visit Macau, giving Beijing the power to dramatically curtail tourism to 
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Macau at will. For this reason, Macau has no alternative to accommodating Beijing’s political 
interests, meaning that “Macau residents, on the whole, prefer to keep quiet, accepting that 
economic growth since the handover has come at the cost of decreased freedoms.”51  
 China also seeks to further economically integrate Hong Kong and Macau into the 
mainland through its Greater Bay Area economic-development initiative, an ambitious project to 
create technological, financial, and transportation links among Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities 
in southeast China. One of the initiative’s most notable projects, the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau 
Bridge, consists of a 55-kilometer-long series of bridges and tunnels, completed in 2018, that cuts 
travel times between the cities by hours.52 
Demographics & Geography 
 A key distinction between Hong Kong and Macau is size. Hong Kong is substantially larger 
than Macau in terms of geographic size (427 square miles vs 44.52 square miles) and population 
(7.39 million vs 622,567).53 Macau’s small population and size make it less independent and 
consequently more susceptible to Beijing’s influence. The city is also in much closer proximity to 
the mainland. Looking at an aerial view, an unfamiliar observer would struggle to point out the 
border between Macau and neighboring Zhuhai. In contrast, Hong Kong’s central business district 
is miles from the mainland border. 
 Another key factor is national identity. In the more than two decades since Hong Kong’s 
handover in 1997, the mainland has failed to impart a Chinese national identity in Hong Kong; in 
fact, younger Hongkongers appear to be forming a Hong Kong identity distinct from mainland 
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China. In a recent survey conducted by Hong Kong University, 90 percent of Hong Kong residents 
between 18 and 29 responded “no” when asked if they were proud to be a Chinese national. In the 
same survey, only 11 percent of Hong Kong residents identified as “Chinese.” The majority prefer 
the term “Hongkonger.”54  
 China has attempted to combat this through educational exchange programs that bring 
Hong Kong students to the mainland. Xu Luying, spokesperson for the mainland’s Hong Kong 
and Macau Affairs Office, suggested that if young Hongkongers visit “the motherland of China 
more and broaden their world view, they will come to see that our country is at a crucial stage of 
renaissance.”55  But Hongkongers appear uninterested in traveling to the mainland. In a poll 
conducted by the Hong Kong Guangdong Youth Association and the Proactive Think Tank, less 
than one quarter of Hongkongers aged 15-39 indicated a willingness to work in neighboring 
Guangdong province. 
 Macau residents hold a much stronger mainland identity than Hongkongers. In December 
2018, The Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute asked Hong Kong and Macau residents 
to rank how strongly they identified as citizens of the Peoples’ Republic of China, with 10 being 
strongest. The average response in Macau was 7.82 56  compared to 5.24 57  in Hong Kong. 
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Hongkongers’ identification as PRC citizens has trended downward since surveyors first asked the 
question in 2007 (see Exhibit A). 
 Another important measure of the mainland’s influence in Hong Kong and Macau is 
Mandarin language penetration. Traditionally Cantonese has been the preferred Chinese dialect in 
Hong Kong and Macau, but the number of residents who understand Mandarin has risen sharply 
in both cities in recent years. According to Stephen Matthews, Professor of Linguistics at Hong 
Kong University, “Mandarin will rapidly become the lingua franca in shops and taxis. That will 
happen in Hong Kong, but first it will happen in Macau.”58  
 Mandarin is more prevalent in Macau than in Hong Kong, in part because of the large 
number of mainland tourists who travel to Macau. Consequently, upwards of 90% of casino jobs 
reportedly require Mandarin proficiency.59  Outside of tourism, Macau’s relatively small size 
naturally limits opportunities in certain fields, potentially driving Macanese residents to seek jobs 
in mainland China that require Mandarin. In contrast, Hongkongers do not face this problem with 
their city’s larger population and more diversified economy. 
 In addition, more than half of Macau’s population was originally born in the mainland, 
with many moving to the city after the handover. The mainlanders have crowded out the Macanese 
— particularly those with European ethnicity — and imparted mainland attitudes and cultural 
norms in the city. Macanese resident Barnaby Ieong complained in a letter to the South China 
Morning Post that “Over the past two decades, most policies, such as in housing and civil service, 
 





were seen to favor new immigrants from the mainland, and most senior posts in the government 
were gradually occupied by them.”60 
Projections for the Future: Macau 
 Macau seems poised for further integration into the mainland, and Xi Jinping’s December 
2019 visit provides several clues about the city’s trajectory. The Chinese government has 
expressed concern about Macau’s lack of economic diversity and seeks to inject new sources of 
economic activity, particularly in the financial sector.  
Xi announced plans to establish a stock exchange in Macau to be denominated in the 
renminbi (RMB), mainland China’s currency, instead of Macau’s currency, the pataca (MOP). The 
renminbi and Hong Kong dollar are already widely accepted in Macau – in fact, many casinos only 
accept the Hong Kong dollar – and using the renminbi in Macau’s upcoming stock exchange will 
further erode the relevance of the pataca.  
Macau may seek to discontinue the pataca in the coming years and adopt the renminbi. It 
would justify doing so for several reasons. First, most visitors to Macau are from mainland China 
and already widely use the renminbi in the city. Given Macau’s gradual integration into mainland 
Chinese mobile payment apps, policymakers may reason that it makes little sense to require nearly 
every transaction to involve a currency conversion. 
Second, since the total amount of patacas in circulation is relatively small, a large exchange 
of patacas for some other currency could materially impact the pataca’s value. To prevent this from 
happening, Macau pegs the pataca’s value to the Hong Kong dollar. In reality, however, the pataca 
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is largely unusable in financial transactions outside of Macau. This would bode poorly for China’s 
attempt to develop a financial industry in the city if it opted to use the pataca.  
Third, Xi has instructed Chinese banks to increase loans within Macau. However, mainland 
banks do not hold significant amounts of the Macanese pataca and would likely prefer to 
denominate loans in renminbi. Finally, Macau is rapidly integrating into the mainland’s Greater 
Bay Area economic-development project, which seeks to create a high-tech zone similar to Silicon 
Valley in Hong Kong, Macau, and several cities in the adjacent Guangdong province. Adoption of 
the renminbi would facilitate cross-border investments and joint-ventures. 
Clearly numerous factors support a switch from the pataca to the renminbi, but abolishing 
the pataca would shatter a highly visible reminder that Macau is not part of mainland China. 
Ultimately, this could pave way for a host of incremental moves towards full integration into the 
mainland. 
 China is also making moves to loosen Macau’s border with the mainland and integrate the 
city with neighboring Zhuhai. Currently, mainland residents wishing to enter Macau must first go 
through Chinese exit immigration before going through Macanese entry immigration. However, a 
newly built checkpoint combines both steps into one e-channel, creating a “joint inspection area” 
over which both the Mainland and Macau have jurisdiction. 
The mainland also plans to lease territory to Macau on nearby Hengqin Island, giving 
Macau space to develop family-friendly tourist attractions. Chinese planners seek to create an 
Asian version of Orlando right next to Asia’s Las Vegas. If Macau’s economic future is literally 
in mainland China on Hengqin Island, China will have further justification to fully integrate Macau 
into the mainland by 2049 or possibly sooner.  
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Finally, Macau residents may face continued erosion of their civil liberties. Macau’s 
Judiciary Police force was recently authorized handle matters of national security (i.e. threats 
against the central government) as well as cybercrime. The Judiciary Police could combine these 
powers to target dissenting online speech. Further, given the recent politically motivated ouster of 
several professors, academics will be cautious about the topics that they research, engaging to 
some degree in self-censorship.  
Projections for the Future: Hong Kong 
 Throughout Hong Kong’s more than two decades under Chinese sovereignty, 
Hongkongers have successfully resisted numerous Chinese attempts to undermine their autonomy, 
ranging from patriotic education to national security laws to the 2019 extradition bill. Though the 
Hong Kong government has attempted to enact these measures, it has backed down when 
Hongkongers took to the streets in mass. 
 Despite their success in stopping certain policies, many Hongkongers are pessimistic about 
the future. One Hong Kong student commented, “Nothing is more important than preserving Hong 
Kong’s core values…[but] I believe that we will be ‘mainlandised’ by the Chinese political system 
and structure, and that cannot be altered.”61 According to a Hong Kong University poll, only 33.8 
percent of Hongkongers are confident in One Country, Two Systems.62 
 The Chinese government has tolerated Hong Kong’s dissent for two reasons. First, Hong 
Kong still plays an important role in facilitating foreign investment in the mainland. China appears 
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to have recognized this vulnerability, which partially explains why China unexpectedly agreed to 
liberalizations in its financial system as part of its Phase I trade deal with the United States.63 
Analysts also believe China’s interest in developing a financial sector in Macau is in part a hedge 
against future turmoil in Hong Kong.64 
 Second, Beijing’s strategy towards Taiwan has been to “govern with benevolence” in Hong 
Kong and Macau to demonstrate the viability of the One Country, Two Systems model. The goal 
is to entice Taiwan to reunify voluntarily with China under a similar arrangement. To that end, 
China has tolerated Hong Kong’s opposition to certain policies.  
 However, more than two decades after the official implementation of One Country, Two 
Systems, Taiwanese reunification looks increasingly unlikely. During the extradition-bill protests, 
unpopular incumbent Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, who is part of a traditionally pro-
independence party, saw her support rise from 25 percent to 45 percent, eventually culminating in 
her reelection.65 This prompted her opponent from the Kuomintang party, which typically favors 
closer ties with the mainland, to disavow publicly the One Country, Two Systems arrangement 
and promise that he would never implement it in Taiwan.  
 As Taiwan becomes increasingly less likely to accept One Country, Two Systems, China 
may become less patient with Hong Kong when it does not fall in line with the mainland’s wishes. 
Luo Huining, Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, 
warned in January 2020 that “If national security systems and mechanisms are absent for a long 
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time in the city, external forces will be able to carry out infiltration and sabotage activities,” 
threatening that this could lead to the destruction of the One Country, Two Systems policy.66 Luo’s 
suggestion of a lack of confidence in Hong Kong’s status is an alarming break from previous CPC 
rhetoric. 
Hongkongers should not expect consent from China for the democratic reforms they seek. 
From China’s perspective, it has already shown significant restraint and accommodation in 
responding to Hong Kong’s political dissent. After all, in 2014 the mainland did offer Hong Kong 
universal suffrage, albeit with restrictions on who could stand as a candidate. According to Lau 
Siu-kai, Vice-Chairman of the semi-official Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau 
Studies, “The central government doesn’t demand Hongkongers love the Communist Party. It just 
hopes Hong Kong people not do anything that would threaten national security.”67 Now, the CPC 
may be growing inpatient over what it perceives as unwarranted insubordination by Hong Kong.  
Pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong do have some reason for optimism. In 2019’s 
district council elections, democrats secured a landslide victory, winning 388 seats compared to 
124 seats in the 2015 election. This gave them control of 17 of 18 district councils.68 Though the 
district councils have relatively minimal power – they focus on local issues such as trash collection 
– democrats have significant momentum going into elections for the more important Legislative 
Council. 
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 There is a narrow path for democrats to gain control of the Legislative Council. The 
Legislative Council has 70 members, only half of which are elected democratically. Of the 35 
democratically elected seats, pro-Beijing parties hold a plurality with 16 seats. But if democrats 
repeat their success from the district council elections, they could conceivably win a significant 
majority of the 35 democratically elected seats. Thirty seats are selected by functional 
constituencies, primarily representing commercial interests. Democrats currently hold seven of 
those seats and are unlikely to pick up many more from this segment. The last five seats are 
selected by the district councils. Democrats currently hold three of these seats and could pick up 
the remaining two.69 
However, there is no guarantee democrats will maintain their momentum. Voters may 
choose pro-Beijing candidates because they are generally more experienced and qualified. Voters 
may also fear a dramatic change in the status quo and a resulting backlash from Beijing. Finally, 
the pro-Beijing candidates are typically better funded and organized. Though Hongkongers 
shockingly rebuked the pro-Beijing establishment in the district council elections, the 
establishment will have had a year to reshape its message leading into the Legislative Council 
elections. Further, democrats may even lose seats from the functional constituencies, which are 
more susceptible to Beijing’s influence.  
Conclusion 
 With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China ended its Century 
of Humiliation, and 70 years later, Xi Jinping has prioritized National Rejuvenation as a core part 
of the CPC’s legitimacy and his personal legacy. As China approaches its centennial in 2049 — 
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the same year in which Macau’s autonomy expires — China seeks to cement a Century of 
Rejuvenation with the full reunification and integration of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 
 Hong Kong and Macau’s unique colonial histories, economic and political institutions, and 
demographics have led the cities to follow divergent paths. As Hong Kong continues to resist 
China’s influence, Macau has staked its economic future on integration with the mainland. 
However, if One Country, Two Systems fails to yield the CPC’s desired results, the party may 
seek to move away from the policy under the guise of national security as it increases the urgency 
of its integration efforts. 
In the U.S., lawmakers closely follow China’s implementation of One Country, Two 
Systems and passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in late 2019 in an effort to 
promote Hong Kong’s semi-autonomy. However, policymakers should remember that although 
One Country, Two Systems is an important policy for the Communist Party of China, it is merely 
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